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A Quantitative Arrow Theorem
Abstract
Arrow’s Impossibility theorem states that any constitution which satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) and unanimity and is not a dictator has to be non-transitive. In this paper we study
quantitative versions of Arrow theorem. Consider n voters who vote independently at random, each following
the uniform distribution over the six rankings of three alternatives. Arrow’s theorem implies that any
constitution which satisfies IIA and unanimity and is not a dictator has a probability of at least 6−n for a non-
transitive outcome. When n is large, 6−n is a very small probability, and the question arises if for large number
of voters it is possible to avoid paradoxes with probability close to 1.
Here we give a negative answer to this question by proving that for every ϵ>0, there exists a δ=δ(ϵ) > 0, which
depends on ϵ only, such that for all n, and all constitutions on three alternatives, if the constitution satisfies:
• The IIA condition.
• For every pair of alternatives a, b, the probability that the constitution ranks a above b is at least ϵ
• For every voter i, the probability that the social choice function agrees with a dictatorship on i at most
1−ϵ
Then the probability of a non-transitive outcome is at least δ.
Our results generalize to any number k ≥ 3 of alternatives and to other distributions over the alternatives. We
further derive a quantitative characterization of all social choice functions satisfying the IIA condition whose
outcome is transitive with probability at least 1 − δ. Our results provide a quantitative statement of Arrow
theorem and its generalizations and strengthen results of Kalai and Keller who proved quantitative Arrow
theorems for k = 3 and for balanced constitutions only, i.e., for constitutions which satisfy for every pair of
alternatives a, b, that the probability that the constitution ranks a above b is exactly 1/2.
The main novel technical ingredient of our proof is the use of inverse-hypercontractivity to show that if the
outcome is transitive with high probability then there are no two different voters who are pivotal with for two
different pairwise preferences with non-negligible probability. Another important ingredient of the proof is
the application of non-linear invariance to lower bound the probability of a paradox for constitutions where all
voters have small probability for being pivotal.
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Abstract
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a Dictator has to be non-transitive.
In this paper we study quantitative versions of Arrow theorem. Consider n voters who vote
independently at random, each following the uniform distribution over the 6 rankings of 3
alternatives. Arrow’s theorem implies that any constitution which satisfies IIA and Unanimity
and is not a dictator has a probability of at least 6−n for a non-transitive outcome. When n is
large, 6−n is a very small probability, and the question arises if for large number of voters it is
possible to avoid paradoxes with probability close to 1.
Here we give a negative answer to this question by proving that for every ǫ > 0, there exists a
δ = δ(ǫ) > 0, which depends on ǫ only, such that for all n, and all constitutions on 3 alternatives,
if the constitution satisfies:
• The IIA condition.
• For every pair of alternatives a, b, the probability that the constitution ranks a above b is
at least ǫ.
• For every voter i, the probability that the social choice function agrees with a dictatorship
on i at most 1− ǫ.
Then the probability of a non-transitive outcome is at least δ.
Our results generalize to any number k ≥ 3 of alternatives and to other distributions over
the alternatives. We further derive a quantitative characterization of all social choice functions
satisfying the IIA condition whose outcome is transitive with probability at least 1 − δ. Our
results provide a quantitative statement of Arrow theorem and its generalizations and strengthen
results of Kalai and Keller who proved quantitative Arrow theorems for k = 3 and for balanced
constitutions only, i.e., for constitutions which satisfy for every pair of alternatives a, b, that the
probability that the constitution ranks a above b is exactly 1/2.
The main novel technical ingredient of our proof is the use of inverse-hypercontractivity
to show that if the outcome is transitive with high probability then there are no two different
voters who are pivotal with for two different pairwise preferences with non-negligible probability.
Another important ingredient of the proof is the application of non-linear invariance to lower
bound the probability of a paradox for constitutions where all voters have small probability for
being pivotal.
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ISF grant 1300/08
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background on Arrow’s Theorem
Arrow’s Impossibility theorem [1, 2] states that certain desired properties cannot hold simulta-
neously for constitutions on three or more alternatives. Arrow’s results were fundamental in the
development of social choice theory in Economics. The most celebrated results in this area are
Arrow’s Impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite [8, 19] Manipulation theorem. Both
results demonstrate the non-existence of ranking and voting schemes with very natural properties.
Arrow’s theorem demonstrates that IIA, Transitivity and Non-dictatorship, all of which will
be defined below, cannot hold simultaneously. Quantitative versions of Arrow’s theorems prove
tradeoff between being ”close to transitive” and being ”close to a dictator” assuming the IIA
property holds. We proceed with a more formal discussion of Arrow’s theorem.
Consider A = {a, b, . . . , }, a set of k ≥ 3 alternatives. A transitive preference over A is a ranking
of the alternatives from top to bottom where ties are not allowed. Such a ranking corresponds to
a permutation σ of the elements 1, . . . , k where σi is the rank of alternative i.
A constitution is a function F that associates to every n-tuple σ = (σ(1), . . . , σ(n)) of transitive
preferences (also called a profile), and every pair of alternatives a, b a preference between a and b.
Some key properties of constitutions include:
• Transitivity. The constitution F is transitive if F (σ) is transitive for all σ. In other words,
for all σ and for all three alternatives a, b and c, if F (σ) prefers a to b, and prefers b to c, it
also prefers a to c. Thus F is transitive if and only if its image is a subset of the permutations
on k elements.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The constitution F satisfies the IIA property
if for every pair of alternatives a and b, the social ranking of a vs. b (higher or lower) depends
only on their relative rankings by all voters.
• Unanimity. The constitution F satisfies Unanimity if the social outcome ranks a above b
whenever all individuals rank a above b.
• The constitution F is a dictator on voter i, if F (σ) = σ(i), for all σ, or F (σ) = −σ, for all σ,
where −σ(i) is the ranking σk(i) > σk−1(i) . . . σ2(i) > σ1(i) by reversing the ranking σ(i).
Arrow’s theorem states [1, 2] that:
Theorem 1.1. Any constitution on three or more alternatives which satisfies Transitivity, IIA and
Unanimity is a dictatorship.
It is possible to give a characterization of all constitutions satisfying IIA and Transitivity. Results
of Wilson [20] provide a partial characterization for the case where voters are allowed to rank some
alternatives as equal. In order to obtain a quantitative version of Arrow theorem, we give an explicit
and complete characterization of all constitutions satisfying IIA and Transitivity in the case where
all voters vote using a strict preference order. Write Fk(n) for the set of all constitutions on k
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alternatives and n voters satisfying IIA and Transitivity. For the characterization it is useful write
A >F B for the statement that for all σ it holds that F (σ) ranks all alternatives in A above all
alternatives in B. We will further write FA for the constitution F restricted to the alternatives in
A. The IIA condition implies that FA depends only on the individual rankings of the alternatives
in the set A. The characterization of Fk(n) we prove is the following.
Theorem 1.2. The class Fk(n) consist exactly of all constitutions F satisfying the following: There
exist a partition of the set of alternatives into disjoint sets A1, . . . , Ar such that:
•
A1 >F A2 >F . . . >F Ar,
• For all As s.t. |As| ≥ 3, there exists a voter j such that FAs is a dictator on voter j.
• For all As such that |As| = 2, the constitution FAs is an arbitrary non-constant function of
the preferences on the alternatives in As.
We note that for all k ≥ 3 all elements of Fk(n) are not desirable as constitutions. Indeed ele-
ments of Fk(n) either have dictators whose vote is followed with respect to some of the alternatives,
or they always rank some alternatives on top some other. For related discussion see [20].
The main goal of the current paper is to provide a quantitative version of Theorem 1.2 assuming
voters vote independently and uniformly at random. Note that Theorem 1.2 above implies that
if F 6∈ Fk(n) then P (F ) ≥ (k!)−n. However if n is large and the probability of a non-transitive
outcome is indeed as small as (k!)−n, one may argue that a non-transitive outcome is so unlikely
that in practice Arrow’s theorem does not hold.
The goal of the current paper is to establish lower bounds on the probability of paradox in
terms that do not depend on n. Instead our results are stated in terms of the statistical distance
between F and the closet element in Fk(n). Thus our result establishes that the only way to avoid
non-transitivity is by being close to the family Fk(n).
In the following subsections we introduce the probabilistic setup, state our main result, discuss
related work and give an outline of the proof.
1.2 Notation and Quantitative Setup
We will assume voters vote independently and uniformly at random so each voter chooses one of
the k! possible rankings with equal probability. We will write P for the underlying probability
measure and E for the corresponding expected value. In this probabilistic setup, it is natural to
measure transitivity as well as how close are two different constitutions.
• Given two constitutions F,G on n voters, we denote the statistical distance between F and
G by D(F,G), so that:
D(F,G) = P[F (σ) 6= G(σ)].
• Given a constitution F , we write T (F ) for the probability that the outcome of F is transitive
and P (F ) for the probability that the outcome of F is non-transitive so (P stands for paradox):
T (F ) = P[F (σ) is transitive], P (F ) = 1− T (F ).
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1.3 Main Result
In our main result we show that
Theorem 1.3. For every number of alternatives k ≥ 1 and ǫ > 0, there exists a δ = δ(ǫ), such
that for every n ≥ 1, if F is a constitution on n voters and k alternatives satisfying:
• IIA and
• P (F ) < δ,
then there exists G ∈ Fk(n) satisfying D(F,G) < k2ǫ. Moreover, one may take:
δ = exp
(
− C
ǫ21
)
, (1)
for some absolute constant 0 < C <∞.
We therefore obtain the following result stated at the abstract:
Corollary 1.4. For any number of alternatives k ≥ 3 and ǫ > 0, there exists a δ = δ(ǫ), such that
for every n, if F is a constitution on n voters and k alternatives satisfying:
• IIA and
• F is k2ǫ far from any dictator, so D(F,G) > k2ǫ for any dictator G,
• For every pair of alternatives a and b, the probability that F ranks a above b is at least k2ǫ,
then the probability of a non-transitive outcome, P (F ), is at least δ, where δ(ǫ) may be taken as
in (1).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that P (F ) < δ. Then by Theorem 1.3 there exists a function
G ∈ Fn,k satisfying D(F,G) < k2ǫ. Note that for every pair of alternatives a and b it holds that:
P[G ranks a above b] ≥ P[F ranks a above b]−D(F,G) > 0.
Therefore for every pair of alternatives there is a positive probability that G ranks a above b. Thus
by Theorem 1.2 it follows that G is a dictator which is a contradiction.
Remark 1.5. Note that if G ∈ Fk(n) and F is any constitution satisfying D(F,G) < k2ǫ then
P (F ) < k2ǫ.
Remark 1.6. The bounds stated in Theorem 1.3 and Corollary 1.4 in terms of k and ǫ is clearly
not an optimal one. We expect that the true dependency has δ which is some fixed power of ǫ.
Moreover we expect that the bound D(F,G) < k2ǫ should be improved to D(F,G) < ǫ.
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1.4 Generalizations and Small Paradox Probability
Theorem 1.3 and Corollary 1.4 extend to more general product distributions. We call a distribution
µ over the permutations of k elements S(k), symmetric if µ(−σ) = µ(σ) for all σ ∈ S(k). We will
write α = α(µ) for min(µ(σ) : σ ∈ S(k)). We will write P and E for the probability and expected
value according to the product measure µn.
Theorem 1.7. Theorem 1.3 and Corollary 1.4 extend to the following setup where voters vote inde-
pendently at random according to a symmetric distribution µ over the permutations of k elements.
In this setup it suffices to take
δ = exp
(
− C1
αǫC2(α)
)
, (2)
where 0 < C1(α), C2(α) <∞. In particular one may take C2(α) = 3 + 1/(2α2).
The dependency of δ on ǫ in (1) and (2) is a bad one. For values of ǫ < O(n−1) it is possible to
obtain better dependency, where δ is polynomial in ǫ. In Section 4 we prove the following.
Theorem 1.8. Consider voting on k alternatives where voters vote uniformly at random from Snk .
Let
1
324
> ǫ > 0. (3)
For every n, if F is a constitution on n voters satisfying:
• IIA and
•
P (F ) <
1
36
ǫ3n−3, (4)
then there exists G ∈ F3(n) satisfying D(F,G) ≤ 10k2ǫ. If each voter follows a symmetric voting
distribution then with minimal probability α then the same statement holds where (3) is replaced
with α2/9 > ǫ > 0 and (4) is replaced with
P (F ) < α2ǫ−
1
2αn−3.
1.5 Related Work
The first attempt at getting a quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem is Theorem 1.2 in a beautiful
paper by Kalai [10] which we state in our notation as follows.
Theorem 1.9. There exists a K > 0 such that the following holds: Consider voting on k = 3
alternatives where voters vote uniformly at random from Sn3 . Assume F is a balanced constitution,
i.e., for every pair a, b, of alternatives, it holds that the probability that F ranks a above b is exactly
1/2. Then if P (F ) < ǫ, then D(F,G) < Kǫ for some dictator G.
Comparing Kalai’s result to Theorem 1.3 we see that
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• Kalai obtains better dependency of δ in terms of ǫ.
• Kalai’s result holds only for k = 3 alternatives, while ours hold for any number of alternatives.
• Kalai’s result holds only when F is balanced while ours hold for all F .
The approach of [10] is based on ”direct” manipulation of the Fourier expression for probability
of paradox. A number of unsuccessful attempts (including by the author of the current paper)
have been made to extend this approach to a more general setup without assuming balance of the
functions and to larger number of alternatives.
A second result of [10] proves that for balanced functions which are transitive the probability
of a paradox is bounded away from zero. Transitivity is a strong assumption roughly meaning
that all voters have the same power. We do not assume transitivity in the current paper. A
related result [14, 15] proved a conjecture of Kalai showing that among all balanced low influence
functions, majority minimizes the probability of a paradox. The low influence condition is weaker
than transitivity,but still requires that no single voter has strong influence on the outcome of the
vote.
Keller [11] extended some of Kalai’s result to symmetric distributions (still under the balance
assumption). Keller [11] also provides lower bounds on the probability of a paradox in the case the
functions are monotone and balanced.
We want to note of some natural limitation to the approach taken in [10] and [11] which is based
on ”direct” analysis of the probability of a paradox in terms of the Fourier expansion. First, this
approach does not provide a proof of Arrow theorem nor does it ever use it (while our approach
does). Second, it is easy to see that one can get small paradox probability by looking at constitutions
on 3 alternatives which almost always rank one candidates at the top. Thus a quantitative version
of Arrow theorem cannot be stated just in terms of distance to a dictator. Indeed an example in [11]
(see Theorem 1.2) implies that for non-balanced functions the probability of a paradox cannot be
related in a linear fashion to the distance from dictator or to other functions in F3(n).
As noted in [10], there is an interesting connection between quantitative Arrow statements and
the concept of testing introduced in [18, 9] which was studied and used extensively since. Roughly
speaking a property of functions is testable if it is possible to perform a randomized test for the
property such that if the probability that the function passes the test is close to 1, then the function
has to be close to a function with the property (say in the hamming distance). In terms of testing,
our result states that among all functions satisfying the IIA property, the Transitivity property is
testable. Moreover, the natural test ”works”: i.e., in order to test for transitivity, one can pick a
random input and check if the outcome is transitive.
We finally want to note that the special case of the quantitative Arrow theorem proved by
Kalai [10] for balanced functions has been used to derive the first quantitative version of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [8, 19] in [7]. The results of [7] are limited in the sense that they
require neutrality and apply only to 3 candidates. It is interesting to explore if the full quantitative
version of Arrow theorem proven here will allow to obtain stronger quantitative version of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
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1.6 Proof Ideas
We first recall the notion of influence of a voter. Recall that for f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, the
influence of voter 1 ≤ i ≤ n is given by
Ii(f) = P[f(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, 0,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) 6= f(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, 1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)],
where X1, . . . ,Xn are distributed uniformly at random. The notion of influence is closely related to
the notion of pivotal voter which was introduced in Barabera’s proof of Arrow’s Theorem [3]. Recall
that voter i is pivotal for f at x if f(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6= f(x1, . . . , xi−1,−1, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Thus the influence of voter i is the expected probability that voter i is pivotal.
We discuss the main ideas of the proof for the case k = 3. By the IIA property that pairwise
preference (a > b), (b > c) and (c > a) are decided by three different functions f, g and h depending
on the pairwise preference of the individual voters.
• The crucial and novel step is showing that for every ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0, such that if two
different voters i 6= j satisfy Ii(f) > ǫ and Ij(g) > ǫ, then the probability of a non-transitive
outcome is at least δ = ǫC , for some C > 0. The proof of this step uses and generalizes the
results of [16], which are based on inverse-hyper-contractive estimates [5]. We show that if
Ii(f) > ǫ and Ij(g) > ǫ then with probability at least ǫ
C , over all voters but i and j, the
restricted f and g, have i and j pivotal. We show how this implies that with probability ǫC
we may chose the rankings of i and j, leading to a non-transitive outcome. And therefore the
probability of a paradox is at least ǫC/36. This step may be viewed as a quantitative version
of a result by Barbera [3]. The main step in Barbera’s proof of Arrow theorem is proving that
if two distinct voters are pivotal for two different pairwise preferences that the constitution
has a non-rational outcome.
• The results above suffice to establish a quantitative Arrow theorem for ǫ = O(n−1). This
follows from the fact that all influences of a function are bounded by ǫn−1 then the function
is O(ǫ) close to a constant function. The probability of paradox obtained here is of order ǫC .
• Next, we show that the statement of the theorem holds when n is large and all functions
f, g, h are symmetric threshold functions. Note that in this case, since symmetric thresholds
functions are low influence functions, the conclusion of the theorem reads: if non of the
alternatives is ranked at top/bottom with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, then the probability of a
paradox is at least δ.
• Using the Majority is stablest result [15] (see also [14]) in the strong form proven in [13] (see
also [12]) we extend the result above as long as for any pair of functions say f, g there exist
no variable for which both Ii(f) and Ii(g) is large.
• The remaining case is where there exists a single voter i, such that Ii(f) is large for at least
two of the functions and all other variables have low influences. By expanding the paradox
probability in terms of the 6 possible ranking of voter i and using the previous case, we obtain
the conclusion of the theorem, i.e., that in this case either there is a non-negligible probability
of a paradox, or the function close to a dictator function on voter i.
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Some notation and preliminaries are given in Section 2. The proof for the case where two
different functions have two different influential voters is given in Section 3. This already allows to
establish a quantitative Arrow theorem in the case where the functions is very close to an element
of Fk(n) in Section 4. The proof of the Gaussian Arrow Theorem is given in Section 5. Applying
”strong” non-linear invariance the result is obtained for low influence functions in Section 6. The
result with one influential variable is the derived in Section 7. The proof of the main result for
3 alternatives is then given in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the proof by deriving the proof for
any number of alternatives. The combinatorial Theorem 1.2 is proven in Section 10. Section 11
provides the adjustment of the proofs needed to obtain the results for symmetric distributions.
1.7 Acknowledgement
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2 Preliminaries
For the proof we introduce some notation and then follow the steps above.
2.1 Some Notation
The following notation will be useful for the proof. A social choice function is a function from a
profile on n permutation, i.e., an element of S(k)n to a binary decision for every pair of alternatives
which one is preferable. The set of pairs of candidates is nothing but
(
k
2
)
. Therefore a social choice
function is a map F : S(k)n → {−1, 1}(k2) where F (σ) = (ha>b(σ) : {a, b} ∈ (k2)) means
F ranks a above b if ha>b(σ) = 1, F ranks b above a if ha>b(σ) = −1.
We will further use the convention that ha>b(σ) = −hb>a(σ).
The binary notation above is also useful to encode the individual preferences σ(1), . . . , σ(n) as
follows. Given σ = σ(1), . . . , σ(n) we define binary vectors xa>b = xa>b(σ) in the following manner:
xa>b(i) = 1, if voter i ranks a above b; xa>b(i) = −1, if voter i ranks a above b
The IIA condition implies that the pairwise preference between any pair of outcomes depends
only on the individual pairwise preferences. Thus, if F satisfies the IIA property then there exists
functions fa>b for every pair of candidates a and b such that
F (σ) = ((fa>b(xa>b) : {a, b} ∈
(
k
2
)
)
We will also consider more general distributions over S(k). We call a distribution µ on S(k)
symmetric if µ(−σ) = µ(σ) for all σ ∈ S(k). We will write α = α(µ) for min(µ(σ) : σ ∈ S(k)).
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2.2 The Correlation Between xa>b and xb>c
For some of the derivations below will need the correlations between the random variables xa>b(i)
and xb>c(i). We have the following easy fact:
Lemma 2.1. Assume that voters vote uniformly at random from S(3). Then:
1. For all i 6= j and all a, b, c, d the variables xa>b(i) and xc>d(j) are independent.
2. If a, b, c are distinct then E[xa>b(i)xb>c(i)] = −1/3.
For the proof of part 2 of the Lemma, note that the expected value depends only on the
distribution over the rankings of a, b, c which is uniform. It thus suffices to consider the case
k = 3. In this case there are 4 permutations where xa>b(i) = xb>c(i) and 2 permutations where
xa>b(i) 6= xb>c(i).
We will also need the following estimate
Lemma 2.2. Assume that voters vote uniformly at random from S(3). Let f = xc>a and let
(Tf)(xa>b, xb>c) = E[f |xa>b, xb>c]. Then
|Tf |2 = 1/
√
3.
Proof. There are two permutations where xa>b, xb>c determine xc>a. For all other permutations
xc>a is equally likely to be −1 and 1 conditioned on xa>b and xb>c. We conclude that |Tf |22 = 1/3
and therefore |Tf |2 = 1/
√
3.
2.3 Inverse Hyper-contraction and Correlated Intersections Probabilities
We will use some corollaries of the inverse hyper-contraction estimates proven by Borell [4]. The
following corollary is from [16].
Lemma 2.3. Let x, y ∈ {−1, 1}n be distributed uniformly and (xi, yi) are independent. Assume
that E[x(i)] = E[y(i)] = 0 for all i and that E[x(i)y(i)] = ρ ≥ 0. Let B1, B2 ⊂ {−1, 1}n be two sets
and assume that
P[B1] ≥ e−α2 , P[B2] ≥ e−β2 .
Then:
P[x ∈ B1, y ∈ B2] ≥ exp(−α
2 + β2 + 2ραβ
1− ρ2 ).
We will need to generalize the result above to negative ρ and further to different ρ value for
different bits.
Lemma 2.4. Let x, y ∈ {−1, 1}n be distributed uniformly and (xi, yi) are independent. Assume
that E[x(i)] = E[y(i)] = 0 for all i and that |E[x(i)y(i)]| ≤ ρ. Let B1, B2 ⊂ {−1, 1}n be two sets
and assume that
P[B1] ≥ e−α2 , P[B2] ≥ e−β2 .
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Then:
P[x ∈ B1, y ∈ B2] ≥ exp(−α
2 + β2 + 2ραβ
1− ρ2 ).
In particular if P[B1] ≥ ǫ and P[B2] ≥ ǫ, then:
P[x ∈ B1, y ∈ B2] ≥ ǫ
2
1−ρ . (5)
Proof. Take z so that (xi, zi) are independent and E[zi] = 0 and E[xizi] = ρ. It is easy to see there
exists wi independent of x, z with s.t. the joint distribution of (x, y) is the same as (x, z ·w), where
z · w = (z1w1, . . . , znwn). Now for each fixed w we have that
P[x ∈ B1, z · w ∈ B2] = P[x ∈ B1, z ∈ w · B2] ≥ exp(−α
2 + β2 + 2ραβ
1− ρ2 ),
where w ·B2 = {w · w′ : w′ ∈ B2}. Therefore taking expectation over w we obtain:
P[x ∈ B1, y ∈ B2] = EP[x ∈ B1, z · w ∈ B2] ≥ exp(−α
2 + β2 + 2ραβ
1− ρ2 )
as needed. The conclusion (5) follows by simple substitution (note the difference with Corollary
3.5 in [16] for sets of equal size which is a typo).
Applying the CLT and using [5] one obtains the same result for Gaussian random variables.
Lemma 2.5. Let N,M be N(0, In) with (N(i),M(i))
n
i=1 independent. Assume that |E[N(i)M(i)]| ≤
ρ. Let B1, B2 ⊂ Rn be two sets and assume that
P[B1] ≥ e−α2 , P[B2] ≥ e−β2 ,
Then:
P[N ∈ B1,M ∈ B2] ≥ exp(−α
2 + β2 + 2ραβ
1− ρ2 ).
In particular if P[B1] ≥ ǫ and P[B2] ≥ ǫ, then:
P[N ∈ B1,M ∈ B2] ≥ ǫ
2
1−ρ . (6)
Proof. Fix the values of α and β and assume without loss of generality that maxi |E[N(i)M(i)]| is
obtained for i = 1. Then by [5] (see also [13]), the minimum of the quantity P[N ∈ B1,M ∈ B2]
under the constraints on the measures given by α and β is obtained in one dimension, where B1
and B2 are intervals I1, I2. Look at random variables x(i), y(i), where E[x(i)] = E[y(i)] = 0 and
E[x(i)y(i)] = E[M1N1]. Let Xn = n
−1/2
∑
i=1 x
a>b(i) and Yn = n
−1/2
∑
i=1 x
a>b(i). Then the CLT
implies that
P[Xn ∈ I1]→ P[N1 ∈ B1], P[Yn ∈ I2]→ P[M1 ∈ B2],
and
P[Xn ∈ I1, Yn ∈ I2]→ P[N1 ∈ B1,M1 ∈ B2].
The proof now follows from the previous lemma.
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3 Two Influential Voters
We begin the proof of Arrow theorem by considering the case of 3 candidates named a, b, c and
two influential voters named 1 and 2. Note that for each voter there are 6 legal values for
(xa>bi , x
b>c
i , x
c>a
i ). These are all vector different from (−1,−1,−1) and (1, 1, 1). Similarly con-
stitution given by fa>b, f b>c and f c>a has a non-transitive outcome if and only if
(fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) ∈ {(−1,−1,−1), (1, 1, 1)}.
3.1 Two Pivots Imply Paradox
We will use the following Lemma which as kindly noted by Barbera was first proven in his paper [3].
Proposition 3.1. Consider a social choice function on 3 candidates a, b and c and two voters
denoted 1 and 2. Assume that the social choice function satisfies that IIA condition and that
voter 1 is pivotal for fa>b and voter 2 is pivotal for f b>c. Then there exists a profile for which
(fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) is non-transitive.
For completeness we provide a proof using the language of the current paper (the proof of [3]
like much of the literature on Arrow’s theorem uses binary relation notation).
Proof. Since voter 1 is pivotal for fa>b and voter 2 is pivotal for f b>c there exist x, y such that
fa>b(0, y) 6= fa>b(1, y), f b>c(x, 0) 6= f b>c(x, 1).
Look at the profile where
xa>b = (x∗, y), xb>c = (x, y∗), xc>a = (−x,−y).
We claim that for all values of x∗, y∗ this correspond to transitive rankings of the two voters. This
follows from the fact that neither (x∗, x,−x) nor (y, y∗,−y) belong to the set {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)}.
Note furthermore we may chose x∗ and y∗ such that
f c>a(−x,−y) = fa>b(x∗, y) = f b>c(x, y∗).
We have thus proved the existence of a non-transitive outcome as needed.
3.2 Two influential Voters Implies Joint Pivotality
Next we establish the following result.
Lemma 3.2. Consider a social choice function on 3 candidates a, b and c and n voters denoted
1, . . . , n. Assume that the social choice function satisfies that IIA condition and that voters vote
uniformly at random. Assume further that I1(f
a>b) > ǫ and I1(f
b>c) > ǫ. Let
B = {σ : 1 is pivotal for fa>b(xa>b(σ)) and 2 is pivotal for f b>c(xb>c(σ))}.
Then
P[B] ≥ ǫ3.
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Proof. Let
B1 = {σ : 1 is pivotal for fa>b}, B2 = {σ : 2 is pivotal for f b>c}.
Then P[B1] = I1(f
a>b) > ǫ and P[B2] = I2(f
b>c) > ǫ, and our goal is to obtain a bound on
P[B1 ∩B2]. Note that the event B1 is determined by xa>b and the event B2 is determined by xb>c.
Further by Lemma 2.1 it follows that E[xa<b(i)] = E[xb>c(i)] = 0 and |E[xa>b(i)xb>c(i)]| = 1/3
The proof now follows from Lemma 2.4.
3.3 Two Influential Voters Imply Non-Transitivity
We can now prove the main result of the section.
Theorem 3.3. Let k ≥ 3 and ǫ > 0. Consider the uniform voting model on S(k). Let F be a
constitution on n voters satisfying:
• IIA and
• There exists three distinct alternatives a, b and c and two distinct voters i and j such that
Ii(f
a>b) > ǫ, Ij(f
b>c) > ǫ.
then P (F ) > 136ǫ
3.
Proof. We look at F restricted to rankings of a, b and c. Note that in the uniform case each
permeation has probability 1/6 Without loss of generality assume that i = 1 and j = 2 and consider
first the case of the uniform distribution over rankings. let B be the event from Lemma 3.2. By the
lemma we have P[B] ≥ ǫ3. Note that if σ ∈ S(3)n satisfies that σ ∈ B, then fixing σ(3), . . . , σ(n)
we may apply Proposition 3.1 to conclude that there are values of σ∗(1) and σ∗(2) leading to a
non-transitive outcome. Therefore:
P[P (F )] ≥ P[(σ∗(1), σ∗(2), σ(3), . . . , σ(n)) : σ ∈ B] ≥ 1
36
P[B] ≥ 1
36
ǫ3.
4 Arrow Theorem for Almost Transitive Functions
In this section we prove a quantitative Arrow Theorem in the case where the probability of a
non-transitive outcome is inverse polynomial in n. In this case it is possible to obtain an easier
quantitative proof which does not rely on invariance. We will use the following easy and well known
Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and assume Ii(f) ≤ ǫn−1 for all i. Then there exist a
constant function s ∈ {−1, 1} such that D(f, s) ≤ 2ǫ.
Similarly, let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and assume Ii(f) ≤ ǫn−1 for all i 6= j. Then there exists
a function g : {−1, 1} → {−1, 1} such that D(f, g(xj)) ≤ 2ǫ.
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Proof. For the first claim, use
1
2
min(P[f = 1],P[f = −1]) ≤ P[f = 1]P[f = −1] = Var[f ] ≤
n∑
i=1
Ii(f) ≤ ǫ. (7)
For the second claim assume WLOG that j = 1. Let f1(x2, . . . , xn) = f(1, x2, . . . , xn) and
f−1(x2, . . . , xn) = f(−1, x2, . . . , xn). Apply (7) to chose s1 so that
D(f1, s1) ≤
∑
i>1
Ii(f1).
Similarly, let s−1 be chosen so that
D(f, s−1) ≤
∑
i>1
Ii(f−1).
Let g(1) = s1 and g(−1) = s−1. Then:
2D(f, g) = D(f1, s1) +D(f−1, s−1) ≤
∑
i>1
Ii(f1) +
∑
i>1
Ii(f−1) = 2
∑
i>1
Ii(f) ≤ 2ǫ.
The proof follows.
Theorem 4.2. Consider voting on 3 alternatives where voters vote uniformly at random from Sn3 .
Let
1
324
> ǫ > 0. (8)
For every n, if F is a constitution on n voters satisfying:
• IIA and
•
P (F ) <
1
36
ǫ3n−3, (9)
then there exists G ∈ F3(n) satisfying D(F,G) ≤ 10ǫ.
Proof. We prove the theorem for the uninform case. The proof for the symmetric case is identical.
Let fa>b, f b>c, f c>a : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be the three pairwise preference functions. Let η = ǫn−1.
Consider three cases:
I. Among the functions fa>b, f b>c, f c>a, there exist two different functions f and g and i 6= j
s.t: Ii(f) > η and Ii(g) > η.
II. There exists a voter i such that for all j 6= i and all f ∈ {fa>b, f b>c, f c>a}, it holds that
Ij(f) < η.
III. There exists two different functions f, g ∈ {fa>b, f b>c, f c>a} such that for all i it holds that
Ii(f) < η and Ii(g) < η.
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Note that each F satisfies one of the three conditions above. Note further that in case I. we
have P (F ) > 136ǫ
3n−3 by Theorem 3.3 which contradicts the assumption (9). So to conclude the
proof is suffices to obtain D(F,G) ≤ 10ǫ assuming (9).
In case II. it follows from Lemma 4.1 that there exists functions ga>b, gb>c and gc>a of voter i
only such that
D(fa>b, ga>b) < 2ǫ, D(f b>c, gb>c) < 2ǫ, D(f c>a, gc>a) < 2ǫ.
Letting G be the constitution defined by the g’s we therefore have D(F,G) ≤ 6ǫ and P (G) ≤
P (F ) + 6ǫ ≤ 9ǫ.
Furthermore if 9ǫ < 136 this implies that PDX(G) = 0. So D(F,F3(n)) ≤ 6ǫ which is a
contradiction.
In the remaining case III. assume WLOG that fa>b and f b>c have all influences small. By
Lemma 4.1 if follows that fa>b and f b>c are 2ǫ far from a constant function. There are now two
subcases to consider. In the first case there exists an s ∈ {±1} such that D(fa>b, s) ≤ 2ǫ and
D(f b>c,−s) ≤ 2ǫ. Note that in the case letting
ga>b = s, gb>c = −s, gc>a = f c>a,
and G be the constitution defined by the g’s, we obtain that G ∈ F3(n) and D(F,G) ≤ 4ǫ.
We finally need to consider the case where D(fa>b, s) ≤ 2ǫ and D(f b>c, s) ≤ 2ǫ for some
s ∈ {±1}. Let A(a, b) be the set of σ where fa>b = −s and similarly for A(b, c) and A(a, c). Then
P[A(a, b)] ≤ 2ǫ and P[A(a, c)] ≤ 2ǫ. Furthermore by transitivity
P[A(a, c)] ≤ P[A(a, b)] +P[A(b, c)] + P (F ) ≤ 6ǫ.
We thus conclude that D(f c>a, s) ≤ 6ǫ. Letting ga>b = gb>c = −gc>a = s and G the constitution
defined by G we have that D(F,G) ≤ 10ǫ. A contradiction. The proof follows
It is now easy to prove Theorem 1.8 for the uniform distribution. The adaptations to symmetric
distributions will be discussed in Section 11.
Proof. The proof follows by applying Theorem 4.2 to triplets of alternatives. We give the proof for
the uniform case. Assume P (F ) < 136ǫ
3n−3.
Note that if g1, g2 : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} are two different function each of which is either a
dictator or a constant function thanD(g1, g2) ≥ 1/2. Therefore for all a, b it holds thatD(fa>b, g) <
10ǫ for at most one function g which is either a dictator or a constant function. In case there exists
such function we let ga>b = g, otherwise, we let ga>b = fa>b.
Let G be the social choice function defined by the functions ga>b. Clearly:
D(F,G) < 10
(
k
2
)
ǫ < 10k2ǫ.
The proof would follow if we could show P (G) = 0 and therefore G ∈ Fk(n).
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To prove that G ∈ Fk(n) is suffices to show that for every set A of three alternatives, it holds
that GA ∈ F3(n). Since P (FA) ≤ P (F ) < 136ǫ3n−3, Theorem 4.2 implies that there exists a function
HA ∈ F3(n) s.t. D(HA, FA) < 10ǫ. There are two cases to consider:
• HA is a dictator. This implies that fa>b is 10ǫ close to a dictator for each a, b and therefore
fa>b = ga>b for all pairs a, b, so GA = HA ∈ F3(n).
• There exists an alternative (say a) that HA always ranks at the top/bottom. In this case we
have that fa>b and f c>a are at most ǫ far from the constant functions 1 and −1 (or −1 and
1). The functions ga>b and gc>a have to take the same constant values and therefore again
we have that GA ∈ F3(n).
The proof follows.
5 The Gaussian Arrow Theorem
The next step is to consider a Gaussian version of the problem. The Gaussian version corresponds
to a situation where the functions fa>b, f b>c, f c>a can only ”see” averages of large subsets of the
voters. We thus define a 3 dimensional normal vector N . The first coordinate of N is supposed to
represent the deviation of the number of voters where a ranks above b from the mean. The second
coordinate is for b ranking above c and the last coordinate for c ranking above a.
Since averaging maintain the expected value and covariances, we define:
E[N21 ] = E[N
2
2 ] = E[N
2
3 ] = 1, (10)
E[N1N2] = E[x
a>b(1)xb>c(1)] := −1/3,
E[N2N3] = E[x
b>c(1)xc>a(1)] := −1/3,
E[N3N1] = E[x
c>a(1)xa>b(1)] := −1/3.
We let N(1), . . . , N(n) be independent copies of N . We write N = (N(1), . . . , N(n)) and for
1 ≤ i ≤ 3 we write Ni = (N(1)i, . . . , N(n)i). The Gaussian version of Arrow theorem states:
Theorem 5.1. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ = δ(ǫ) > 0 such that the following hold. Let
f1, f2, f3 : R
n → {−1, 1}. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds that
P[fi(Ni) = u, fi+1(Ni+1) = −u] ≤ 1− ǫ (11)
Then with the setup given in (10) it holds that:
P[f1(N1) = f2(N2) = f3(N3)] ≥ δ.
Moreover, one may take δ = (ǫ/2)18.
We note that the negation of condition (11) corresponds to having one of the alternatives at the
top/bottom with probability at least 1 − ǫ. Therefore the theorem states that unless this is the
case, the probability of a paradox is at least δ. Since the Gaussian setup excludes dictator functions
in terms of the original vote, this is the result to be expected in this case.
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Proof. We will consider two cases: either all the functions fi satisfy |Efi| ≤ 1 − ǫ, or there exists
at least one function with |Efi| > 1− ǫ.
Assume first that there exist a function fi with |Efi| > 1− ǫ. Without loss of generality assume
that P[f1 = 1] > 1 − ǫ/2. Note that by (11) it follows that P[f2 = 1] > ǫ/2 and P[f3 = 2] > ǫ/2.
By Lemma 2.5, we have P[f2(N2) = 1, f3(N3) = 1] > (ǫ/2)3. We now look at the function
g = 1(f2 = 1, f3 = 1). Let
M1 =
√
3
2
(N2 +N3), M2 =
√
3
2
√
2
(N2 −N3).
Then it is easy to see that M2(i) is uncorrelated with and therefore independent off N1(i),M1(i)
for all i. Moreover, for all i the covariance betweenM1(i) and N1(i) is 1/
√
3 (this also follows from
Lemma 2.2) and 1− 1/√3 > 1/3. We may now apply Lemma 2.5 with the vectors
(N1(1), . . . ,N1(n), Z1, . . . , Zn), (M1(1), . . . ,M1(n),M2(1), . . . ,M2(n)),
where Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) is a normal Gaussian vector independent of anything else. We obtain:
P[f1(N1) = 1, f2(N2) = 1, f3(N3) = 1] = P[f1(N1, Z) = 1, g(M1,M2) = 1] ≥ ((ǫ/2)3)
2
1/3 ≥ (ǫ/2)18.
We next consider the case where all functions satisfy |Efi| ≤ 1−ǫ. In this case at least two of the
functions obtain the same value with probability at least a 1/2. Let’s assume that P[f1 = 1] ≥ 1/2
and P[f2 = 1] ≥ 1/2. Then by Lemma 2.5 we obtain that
P[f1 = 1, f2 = 1] ≥ 1/8.
Again we define g = 1(f1 = 1, f2 = 1). Since P[f3 = 1] > ǫ/2, we may apply Lemma 2.5 and obtain
that:
P[f1 = 1, f2 = 1, f3 = 1] = P[f1 = 1, g = 1] ≥ (ǫ/2)3.
This concludes the proof.
6 Arrow Theorem for Low Influence Functions
Our next goal is to apply Theorem 5.1 along with invariance in order to obtain Arrow theorem
for low influence functions. Non linear invariance principles were proven in [17] and latter in [15]
and [13]. We will use the two later results which have quantitative bounds in terms of the influences.
The proof for uniform voting distributions follows in a straightforward manner from Theorem 5.1,
Kalai’s formula and the Majority is Stablest (MIST) result in the strong form stated at [6, 13] where
it is allowed that for each variable one of the functions has high influence. The proof follows since
Kalai’s formula allows to write the probability of a paradox as sum of correlation terms between
pairs of function and each correlation factor is asymptotically minimized by symmetric monotone
threshold functions. Therefore the overall expression is also minimized by symmetric monotone
threshold functions. However, Theorem 5.1 provides a lower bound on the probability of paradox
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for symmetric threshold functions so the proof follows. The case of symmetric distributions is much
more involved and will be discussed in subsection 11.5.
We finally note that the application of invariance is the step of the proof where δ becomes very
small (more than exponentially small in ǫ, instead of just polynomially small). A better error
estimate in invariance principles in terms of influences will thus have a dramatic effect on the value
of δ.
6.1 Arrow’s theorem for low influence functions.
We first recall the following result from Kalai [10].
Lemma 6.1. Consider a constitution F on 3 voters satisfying IIA and let F be given by fa>b, f b>c
and f c>a. Then:
P (F ) =
1
4
(
1 +E[fa>b(xa>b)f b>c(xb>c)] +E[f b>c(xb>c)f c>a(xc>a)] +E[f c>a(xc>a)fa>b(xa>b)]
)
(12)
Proof. Let s : {−1, 1}3 → {0, 1} be the indicator function of the set {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)}. Recall
that the outcome of F is non-transitive iff
s(fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) = 1.
Moreover s(x, y, z) = 1/4(1 + xy + yz + zx). The proof follows.
Theorem 6.2. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ(ǫ) > 0 and a τ(δ) > 0 such that the following holds.
Let f1, f2, f3 : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds that
P[fi = u, fi+1 = −u] ≤ 1− 2ǫ (13)
and for all j it holds that
|{1 ≤ i ≤ 3 : Ij(fi) > τ}| ≤ 1. (14)
Then it holds that
P(f1, f2, f3) ≥ δ.
Moreover, assuming the uniform distribution, one may take:
δ =
1
8
(ǫ/2)20, τ = τ(δ),
where
τ(δ) := δC
log(1/δ)
δ ,
for some absolute constant C.
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Proof. Let g1, g2, g3 : R → {−1, 1} be of the form gi = sgn(x− ti), where ti is chosen so that E[gi] =
E[fi] (where the first expected value is according to the Gaussian measure). Let N1, N2, N3 ∼
N(0, 1) be jointly Gaussian with E[NiNi+1] = −1/3. From Theorem 5.1 it follows that:
P (g1, g2, g3) > 8δ,
and from the Majority is Stablest theorem as stated in Theorem 6.3 and Lemma 6.8 in [13], it
follows that by choosing C in the definition of τ large enough, we have:
E[f1(x
a>b)f2(x
b>c)] ≥ E[g1(N1)g2(N2)]− δ, E[f2(xa>b)f3(xb>c)] ≥ E[g2(N1)g3(N2)]− δ,
E[f3(x
a>b)f1(x
b>c)] ≥ E[g3(N1)g1(N2)]− δ.
From (12) and (32) it now follows that:
P (f1, f2, f3) ≥ P (g1, g2, g3)− 3δ/4 > 7δ,
as needed.
7 One Influential Variable
The last case to consider is where there is a single influential variable. This case contains in
particular the case of the dictator function. Indeed, our goal in this section will be to show that
if there is a single influential voter and the probability of an irrational outcome is small, then the
function must be close to a dictator function or to a function where one of the alternatives is always
ranked at the bottom (top).
Theorem 7.1. Consider the voting model with three alternatives and either uniform votes and
α = 1/6, For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ(ǫ) > 0 and a τ(δ) > 0 such that the following holds.
Let f1, f2, f3 : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and let F be the social choice function defined by letting fa>b =
f1, f
b>c = f2 and f
c>a = f3. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and j > 1 it holds that
Ij(fi) < ατ. (15)
Then either
P(f1, f2, f3) ≥ αδ, (16)
or there exists a function G ∈ F3(n) such that D(F,G) ≤ 9ǫ. Moreover, assuming the uniform
distribution, one may take:
δ = (ǫ/2)20, τ = τ(δ).
Proof. Consider the functions f bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and b ∈ {−1, 1} defined by
f bi (x2, . . . , xn) = fi(b, x2, . . . , xn).
Note that for all b ∈ {−1, 1}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and for all j > 1 it holds that Ij(f bii ) < τ and therefore
we may apply Theorem 6.2. We obtain that for every b = (b1, b2, b3) /∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)}
either:
P(f b11 , f
b2
2 , f
b3
3 ) ≥ δ, (17)
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or there exist a u(b, i) ∈ {−1, 1} and an i = i(b) such that
min(P[f bii = u(b, i)],P[f
bi+1
i+1 = −u(b, i)]) ≥ 1− 3ǫ. (18)
Note that if there exists a vector b = (b0, b1, b2) /∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)} for which (17) holds
then (16) follows immediately.
It thus remains to consider the case where (18) holds for all 6 vectors b. In this case we will
define new functions gi as follows. We let gi(b, x2, . . . , xn) = u if P[f
bi
i = u] ≥ 1−3ǫ for u ∈ {−1, 1}
and gi(b, x2, . . . , xn) = fi(b, x2, . . . , xn) otherwise. We let G be the social choice function defined
by g1, g2 and g3. From (18) it follow that for every b = (b0, b1, b2) /∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)} there
exists two functions gi, gi+1 and a value u s.t. gi(bi, x2, . . . , xn) is the constant function u and
gi+1(bi+1, x2, . . . , xn) is the constant function −u. So
P (g1, g2, g3) = P[(g1, g2, g3) ∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)}] = 0,
and therefore G ∈ F3(n). It is further easy to see that D(fi, gi) ≤ 3ǫ for all i and therefore:
D(F,G) ≤ D(f1, g1) +D(f2, g2) +D(f3, g3) ≤ 9ǫ.
The proof follows.
8 Quantitative Arrow Theorem for 3 Candidates
We now prove a quantitative version of Arrow theorem for 3 alternatives.
Theorem 8.1. Consider voting on 3 alternatives where voters vote uniformly at random from Sn3 .
Let ǫ > 0. Then there exists a δ = δ(ǫ), such that for every n, if F is a constitution on n voters
satisfying:
• IIA and
• P (F ) < δ,
then there exists G ∈ F3(n) satisfying D(F,G) < ǫ. Moreover, one can take
δ = exp
(
− C
ǫ21
)
. (19)
Proof. Let fa>b, f b>c, f c>a : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be the three pairwise preference functions. Let
η = δ (where the values of C will be determined later). We will consider three cases:
• There exist two voters i 6= j ∈ [n] and two functions f 6= g ∈ {fa>b, f b>c, f c>a} such that
Ii(f) > η, Ij(g) > η. (20)
• For every two functions f 6= g ∈ {fa>b, f b>c, f c>a} and every i ∈ [n], it holds that
min(Ii(f), Ii(g)) < η. (21)
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• There exists a voter j′ such that for all j 6= j′
max(Ij(f
a>b), Ij(f
b>c), Ij(f
c>a)) < η. (22)
First note that each F satisfies at least one of the three conditions (20), (21) or (22). Thus it
suffices to prove the theorem for each of the three cases.
In (20), we have by Theorem 3.3 have that
P (F ) >
1
36
η3.
We thus obtain that P (F ) > δ where δ is given in (19) by taking larger values C ′ for C.
In case (21), by Theorem 6.2 it follows that either there exist a function G which always put a
candidate at top / bottom and D(F,G) < ǫ (if (13) holds), or P (F ) > Cǫ20 >> δ.
Similarly in the remaining case (22), we have by Theorem 7.1 that either D(F,G) < ǫ or
P (F ) > Cǫ20 >> δ. The proof follows.
9 Proof Concluded
We now conclude the proof.
Theorem 9.1. Consider voting on k alternatives where voters vote uniformly at random from Snk .
Let 1100 > ǫ > 0. Then there exists a δ = δ(ǫ), such that for every n, if F is a constitution on n
voters satisfying:
• IIA and
• P (F ) < δ,
then there exists G ∈ Fk(n) satisfying D(F,G) < k2ǫ.
Moreover, one can take
δ = exp
(
− C
ǫ21
)
. (23)
Proof. The proof follows by applying Theorem 8.1 to triplets of alternatives. Assume P (F ) < δ(ǫ).
Note that if g1, g2 : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} are two different function each of which is either a
dictator or a constant function thanD(g1, g2) ≥ 1/2. Therefore for all a, b it holds thatD(fa>b, g) <
ǫ/10 for at most one function g which is either a dictator or a constant function. In case there
exists such function we let ga>b = g, otherwise, we let ga>b = fa>b.
Let G be the social choice function defined by the functions ga>b. Clearly:
D(F,G) <
(
k
2
)
ǫ < k2ǫ.
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The proof would follow if we could show P (G) = 0 and therefore G ∈ Fk(n).
To prove that G ∈ Fk(n) is suffices to show that for every set A of three alternatives, it holds
that GA ∈ F3(n). Since P (F ) < δ implies P (FA) < δ, Theorem 8.1 implies that there exists a
function HA ∈ F3(n) s.t. D(HA, FA) < ǫ. There are two cases to consider:
• HA is a dictator. This implies that fa>b is ǫ close to a dictator for each a, b and therefore
fa>b = ga>b for all pairs a, b, so GA = HA ∈ F3(n).
• There exists an alternative (say a) that HA always ranks at the top/bottom. In this case we
have that fa>b and f c>a are at most ǫ far from the constant functions 1 and −1 (or −1 and
1). The functions ga>b and gc>a have to take the same constant values and therefore again
we have that GA ∈ F3(n).
The proof follows.
Remark 9.2. Note that this proof is generic in the sense that it takes the quantitative Arrow’s
result for 3 alternatives as a black box and produces a quantitative Arrow result for any k ≥ 3
alternatives.
10 The class Fk(n)
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2. As noted before Wilson [20] gave a partial characterization
of functions satisfying IIA. Using a version of Barbera’s lemma and the fact we consider only strict
orderings we are able to give a complete characterization of the class Fk(n). For the discussion
below it would be useful to say that the constitution F is a Degenerate if there exists an alternative
a such that for all profiles F ranks at the top (bottom). The constitution F is Non Degenerate
(ND) if it is not degenerate.
10.1 Different Pivots for Different Choices imply Non-Transitivity
We begin by considering the case of 3 candidates named a, b, c and n voters named 1, . . . , n. We
first state Barbera’s lemma in this case.
Theorem 10.1. Consider a social choice function on 3 candidates a, b and c and n voters denoted
1, 2, . . . , n. Assume that the social choice function satisfies that IIA condition and that there exists
voters i 6= j such that voter i is pivotal for fa>b and voter j is pivotal for f b>c. Then there exists
a profile for which (fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) is non-transitive.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that voter 1 is pivotal for fa>b and voter 2 is pivotal for
f b>c. Therefore there exist x2, . . . , xn satisfying
fa>b(+1, x2, . . . , xn) 6= fa>b(−1, x2, . . . , xn) (24)
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and y1, y3, . . . , yn satisfying
f b>c(y1,+1, y3, . . . , yn) 6= f b>c(y1,−1, y3, . . . , yn). (25)
Let z1 = −y1 and zi = −xi for i ≥ 2. By (24) and (25) we may choose x1 and y2 so that
fa>b(x) = f b>c(y) = f(z),
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) and z = (z1, . . . , zn). Note further, that by construction
for all i it holds that
(xi, yi, zi) /∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)},
and therefore there exists a profile σ such that
x = x(σ), y = y(σ), z = z(σ).
The proof follows.
10.2 n voters, 3 Candidates
In order to prove Theorem 1.2 we need the following proposition regarding constitutions of a single
voter.
Proposition 10.2. Consider a constitution F of a single voter and three alternatives {a, b, c} which
satisfies IIA and transitivity. Then exactly one of the following conditions hold:
• F is constant. In other words, F (σ) = τ for all σ and some fixed τ ∈ S(3).
• There exists an alternative c such that c is always ranked at the top (bottom) of the ranking
and fa>b(x) = x or fa>b(x) = −x.
• F (σ) = σ for all σ
• F (σ) = −σ for all σ.
Proof. Assume F is not constant, then there exist two alternatives a, b such that fa>b is not constant
and therefore fa>b(x) = x or fa>b(x) = −x. Let c be the remaining alternative. If c is always
ranked at the bottom or the top the claim follows. Otherwise one of the functions fa>c or f b>c is
not constant. We claim that in this case all three functions are non-constant. Suppose by way of
contradiction that f c>a is the constant 1. This means that c is always ranked on top of a. However,
since fa>b is non-constant there exists a value x such that fa>b(x) = 1 and similarly there exist a
value y such that f b>c(y) = 1. Let σ be a ranking whose a > b preference is given by x and whose
b > c preferences are given by y. Then G(σ) satisfies that a is preferred to b and b is preferred to
c. Thus by transitivity it follows that a is preferred to c - a contradiction. The same argument
applied if f c>a is the constant −1 or if f b>c is a constant function.
We have thus established that all three functions fa>b, f b>c and f c>a are of the form f(x) = x of
f(x) = −x. To conclude we want to show that all three functions are identical. Suppose otherwise.
Then two of the functions have the same sign while the third has a different sign. Without loss of
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generality assume fa>b(x) = f b>c(x) = x and f c>a(x) = −x. Then looking at the profile a > b > c
we see that σ′ = F (σ) must satisfy a > b and b > c but also c > a a contradiction. A similar proof
applies when fa>b(x) = f b>c(x) = −x and f c>a(x) = x.
Theorem 10.3. Any constitution on three alternatives which satisfies Transitivity, IIA and ND is
a dictator.
Proof. There are two cases to consider. The first case is where two of the functions fa>b, f b>c
and f c>a are constant. Without loss of generality assume that fa>b and f b>c are constant. Note
that if fa>b is the constant 1 and f b>c is the constant −1 then b is ranked at the bottom for all
social outcomes in contradiction to the ND condition. A similar contradiction is derived if fa>b
is the constant −1 and f b>c is the constant 1. We thus conclude that fa>b = f b>c. However by
transitivity this implies that f c>a is also a constant function and f c>a = −fa>b.
The second case to consider is where at least two of the functions fa>b, f b>c and f c>a are not
constant. Assume without loss of generality that fa>b, f b>c are non-constant. Therefore, each has
at least one pivotal voter. From Theorem 10.1 it follows that there exists a single voter i such that
each of the functions is either constant, or has a single pivotal voter i. We thus conclude that F
is of the form F (σ) = G(σ(i)) for some function G. Applying Proposition 10.2 shows that either
G(σ) = σ or G(σ) = −σ and concludes the proof.
10.3 The Characterization Theorem
We now prove Theorem 1.2. Given a set of alternatives A′ ⊂ A and an alternative b /∈ A, we write
b ∼ A′ if there exist two alternatives a, a′ ∈ As and two profiles σ and σ′ s.t. F (σ) ranks b above
a and F (σ′) ranks a′ above b. Note that if it does not hold that b ∼ A′ then either {b} >F A′ or
A′ >F {b}.
We will use the following lemmas.
Lemma 10.4. Let F be a transitive constitution satisfying IIA and A1, . . . , Ar, {b} disjoint sets of
alternatives satisfying A1 >F A2 >F . . . >F Ar. Then either
• There exists an 1 ≤ s ≤ r + 1 such
A1 >F . . . >F As−1 > {b} >F As >F . . . >F Ar, (26)
or
• There exist an 1 ≤ s ≤ r such that b ∼ Ar and
A1 >F . . . >F As ∪ {b} >F As+1 >F . . . >F Ar. (27)
Proof. Consider first the case where for all s it does not hold that b ∼ As. In this case for all
s either b >F As or As >F b. Since b >F As implies b >F As+1 >F . . . and As′ >F b implies
. . . >F As′−1 >F As′ >F b for all s, s
′ by transitivity, equation (26) follows.
Next assume b ∼ As. We argue that in this case
. . . >F As−1 >F {b} >F As+1 >F . . . ,
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which implies (27).
Suppose by contradiction that b >F As+1 does not hold. Then there exists an element a ∈ As+1
and a profile σ where F (σ) ranks a above b. From the fact that b ∼ As it follows that there exist
c ∈ As and a profile σ′ where F (σ′) ranks b above c above a. We now look at the constitution F
restricted to B = {a, b, c}. For each of a, b, c there exist at least one profile where they are not
at the top/bottom of the social outcome. It therefore follows that Theorem 10.3 applies to FB
and that FB is a dictator. However, the assumption that As >F As+1 implies that c >F a. A
contradiction. The proof that Fs−1 >F b is identical.
Lemma 10.5. Let F be a constitution satisfying transitivity and IIA. Let A be a set of alternatives
such that FA is a dictator and b ∼ A. Then FA∪{b} is a dictator.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that FA(σ) = σ(i). Let a ∈ A be such that there exist
a profile where F ranks a above b and c ∈ A be such there exists a profile where a is ranked
below c. Let B = {a, b, c}. Then FB satisfies the condition of Theorem 10.3 and is therefore
dictator. Moreover since the fa>c(x) = x(i) it follows that fa>b(x) = x(i) and f b>c(x) = x(i).
Let d be any other alternative in A. Let B = {a, b, d}. Then since fa>b(x) = fa>d(x) = x(i), the
conditions of Theorem 10.3 hold for FB and therefore f
b>d(x) = x(i). We have thus concluded that
FA∪{b}(σ) = σ for all σ as needed. The proof for the case where FA(σ) = −σ is identical.
Theorem 10.3 also immediately implies the following:
Lemma 10.6. Let F be a constitution satisfying transitivity and IIA. Let A be a set of two alter-
natives such that FA is not constant and b ∼ A. Then FA∪{b} is a dictator.
We can now prove Theorem 1.2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of alternatives k. The case k = 2 is trivial. Either
F always ranks a above b in which case {a} >F {b} as needed or F is a non-constant function in
which case the set A = {a, b} satisfies the desired conclusion.
For the induction step assume the theorem holds for k alternatives and let F be a constitution
on k+1 alternatives which satisfies IIA and Transitivity. Let B be a subset of k of the alternatives
and b = A \B.
By by the induction hypothesis applied to FB , we may write B as a disjoint union of A1, . . . , Ar
such that A1 >F A2 > . . . >F Ar and such that if As is of size 3 or more then FAs is a dictator
and if FAs is of size two then FAs is non constant. We now apply Lemma 10.4. If (26) holds then
the proof follows. If (27) holds then the proof would follow once we show that FC is of the desired
form where C = As ∪ {b}. If As is of size 1 then from the definition of ∼ it follows that FAs∪{b}
is non-constant as needed. If As is of size 2 then Lemma (10.6) implies that FAs∪{b} is a dictator
as needed and for the case of As of size 3 or more this follows from Lemma (10.5). The proof
follows.
24
11 Symmetric Distributions
In this section we provide some details on how to prove the results stated for general symmetric dis-
tributions. Most of the generalizations are straightforward. The main exception is Arrow theorem
for low influences functions and the corresponding Gaussian result. These results require extension
of the Invariance machinery and are developed in subsections 11.4 and 11.5.
11.1 The Correlation Between xa>b and xb>c
The same proof of Lemma 2.1 gives the following:
Lemma 11.1. Assume that voters vote independently at random following a symmetric distribution
µ S(3) with minimal atom probability α. Then:
1. For all a, b and i it holds that E[xa>b(i)] = 0.
2. For all i 6= j and all a, b, c, d the variables xa>b(i) and xc>d(j) are independent.
3. If a, b, c are distinct then |E[xa>b(i)xb>c(i)]| ≤ 1− 4α.
Similarly ro Lemma 2.2 we obtain
Lemma 11.2. Assume that voters vote from a symmetric distribution µ on S(3). Let f = xc>a
and Let (Tf)(xa>b, xb>c) = E[f |xa>b, xb>c]. Then
|Tf |2 ≤
√
1− 4α.
Proof. The proof is identical to the previous proof.
11.2 Two Influential Voters
We briefly note that repeating the proofs of Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 we obtain the same results
with
• In Lemma 3.2 we obtain the lower bound
P[B] ≥ ǫ 12α .
• In Theorem 3.3 we obtain the lower bound P (F ) > β2ǫ 12α , where β = αk!/6.
11.3 Almost Transitive Functions
We note that the same proof of Theorem 4.2 gives the following result for symmetric distributions.
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Theorem 11.3. Consider voting on 3 alternatives where each voter follows a symmetric voting
distribution with minimal probability α. Let
α2
9
> ǫ > 0. (28)
For every n, if F is a constitution on n voters satisfying:
• IIA and
•
P (F ) < α2ǫ3n−
1
2α . (29)
then there exists G ∈ F3(n) satisfying D(F,G) ≤ 10ǫ.
Theorem 11.3 implies in turn the second assertion of Theorem 1.8.
11.4 The Gaussian Arrow Theorem
We start by proving a version of Theorem 5.1 for symmetric distributions.
Since averaging maintains the expected value and covariances, we define:
E[N21 ] = E[N
2
2 ] = E[N
2
3 ] = 1, (30)
E[N1N2] = E[x
a>b(1)xb>c(1)] := ρ1,2,
E[N2N3] = E[x
b>c(1)xc>a(1)] := ρ2,3,
E[N3N1] = E[x
c>a(1)xa>b(1)] := ρ3,1.
We let N(1), . . . , N(n) be independent copies of N . We write N = (N(1), . . . , N(n)) and for
1 ≤ i ≤ 3 we write Ni = (N(1)i, . . . , N(n)i). The variant of Theorem 5.1 we prove is the following.
Theorem 11.4. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ = δ(ǫ) > 0 such that the following hold. Let
f1, f2, f3 : R
n → {−1, 1}. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds that
P[fi(Ni) = u, fi+1(Ni+1) = −u] ≤ 1− ǫ (31)
Then with the setup given in (10) it holds that:
P[f1(N1) = f2(N2) = f3(N3)] ≥ δ.
Moreover, one may take δ = (ǫ/2)1/2α
2
.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. Note that if P[f2 = 1] > ǫ/2 and
P[f3 = 1] > ǫ/2 then:
P[f2 = 1, f3 = 1] > (ǫ/2)
1/2α.
Again we define M1,M2 so that M2 is uncorrelated with N . Using Lemma 11.2 we obtain that
the correlation between M1(i) and N (i) is at most
√
1− 4α. Using 1 − √1− 4α ≥ 2α one then
obtains
P[f1 = 1, f2 = 1, f3 = 1] > (ǫ/2)
1
2α2 .
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11.4.1 Kalai’s Formula and [−1, 1] Valued Votes.
In this subsection we will give a more detailed description of the functions that achieve minimum
probability of a paradox in the Gaussian case. We will first generalize Lemma 6.1.
The same proof of Lemma 6.1 gives the following:
Lemma 11.5. Consider the setup of Theorem 5.1. Then:
P[f1(N1) = f2(N2) = f3(N3)] = 1
4
(1 +E[f1(N1)f2(N2)] +E[f2(N2)f3(N3)] +E[f3(N3)f1(N1)])
(32)
Given the basic voting setup, we define P (f1, f2, f3) for three function f1, f2, f3 : {−1, 1}n →
[−1, 1] by letting
P (f1, f2, f3) = E[s(f1(x
a>b, f2(x
b>c), f3(x
c>a)]
=
1
4
(
1 +E[f1(x
a>b)f2(x
b>c)] +E[f2(x
b>c)f3(x
c>a)] +E[f3(x
c>a)f1(x
a>b)]
)
.
Similarly, given three function f1, f2, f3 : R
n → [−1, 1] we define
P (f1, f2, f3) = E[s(f1(N1,N2,N3))]
=
1
4
(1 +E[f1(N1)f2(N2))] +E[f2(N2)f3(N3)] +E[f3(N3)f1(N1)]) ,
where Ni are define in (10).
We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 11.6. The functions s : [0, 1]3 → R defined by s(x, y, z) = 1/4(1 + xy + yz + zx) takes
values in [0, 1]. Moreover, if x, y, z take value at most (1 − ǫ) (at least −1 + ǫ) then the function
takes the value at least ǫ2/4.
Proof. Both statements follow from the fact that s takes the values 0, 1 on the vertices of the cube
and that s is affine in each of the coordinates. Note that on the vertices of the cube [−1, 1 − ǫ]3
the function s takes the values 1, ǫ/2, ǫ2/4 and 1/4 + 3/4(1 − ǫ)2.
We can now state and prove the [−1, 1] version of the Gaussian Arrow theorem.
Theorem 11.7. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that the following hold. Let f1, f2, f3 :
R
n → [−1, 1]. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds that
min(uE[fi],−uE[fi+1]) ≤ 1− 2ǫ (33)
Then with the setup given in (10) it holds that:
P(f1, f2, f3) ≥ δ.
Moreover, in the uniform case one may take δ = (ǫ/2)20. In the general case one may take
δ = (ǫ/2)2+1/(2α
2).
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Proof. We will prove the claim for the uniform case. Again we consider two cases. The first case to
consider is where there exist a function fi and u ∈ {−1, 1} with P[|fi− u| < ǫ] > 1− ǫ/2. Without
loss of generality assume that P[f1 ≥ 1− ǫ] > 1− ǫ/2 and note that this implies that E[f1] > 1−2ǫ.
By (33) it therefore follows that E[f2] > −1 + 2ǫ and E[f3] > −1 + 2ǫ. We thus conclude that
P[f2 > −1+ ǫ] > ǫ/2 and P[f3 > −1+ ǫ] > ǫ/2. Let B1, B2, B3 denote the sets where f1, f2, f3 take
value greater than −1 + ǫ and let B denote the intersection of these sets. Repeating the argument
in the previous lemma we obtain
P[B] ≥ (ǫ/2)18.
By Lemma 11.6 on the event B, the value of s(f1, f2, f3), is at least ǫ
2/2, and on the complement
of B, it is non-negative. We thus conclude
P (f1, f2, f3) ≥ (ǫ/2)20.
In the second case, all functions satisfy P[fi ≤ 1 − ǫ] ≥ ǫ/2. Then, letting Ai denote the event
where fi ≤ 1 − ǫ and repeating the argument above, we obtain the same bound. The proof for
non-uniform distributions is identical.
Remark 11.8. We briefly note that Theorem 11.7 and the other theorems proven in this section
hold in further generality, where voters vote independently according to any (perhaps not symmet-
ric) distribution over the rankings where the probability of any ranking is at least α. The proof of
these extensions is identical to the proofs provided here.
11.5 Arrow Theorem for Low Influence Functions
The proof for symmetric distributions is way more involved than the proof for uniform distributions.
The main difference between the two cases is while in the uniform case in the expansion (12) each
correlation factor is asymptotically minimized by symmetric monotone threshold functions and
therefore the overall expression is also minimized by symmetric monotone threshold functions.
In the general symmetric case, it is impossible to apply invariance to pairs of functions as one
of the correlations parameters in (12) may be positive in which case it is maximized (rather than
minimized) by monotone symmetric threshold functions. To deal with this case we therefore derive
an appropriate extension of invariance which may be of independent interest. Roughly speaking the
extension establishes a map Ψ mapping B = {f : {−1, 1}n → [−1, 1]} to G = {f : Rn → [−1, 1]}
such that for functions with low influences E[fg] is close to E[Ψ(f)Ψ(g)] where the first expected
value is with respect to two correlated input from the uniform measure on {−1, 1} and the second
is with respect to two correlated Gaussian in Rn.
11.5.1 Symmetric Distributions
For the statement below we recall the notion of low degree influence. For a functions f : {−1, 1}n →
R where {−1, 1}n is equipped with the uniform measure, the degree d influence of the i’th variable
of f is defined by:
I≤d(f) =
∑
S:|S|≤d,i∈S
fˆ2(S). (34)
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Obviously I≤di (f) ≤ I(f). The usefulness of I≤di to be used in the next subsection comes from the
fact that ∑
i
I≤di (f) ≤ d ·Var[f ]. (35)
11.5.2 Invariance Result
Our starting point will be the following extensions of results from [15] and [13].
Theorem 11.9. For all ǫ,−1 < ρ < 1 the following holds. Consider the space {−1, 1}n equipped
with the uniform measure and the space Rn equipped with the Gaussian measure. Then for every
function f : {−1, 1}n → [−1, 1] there exists a function f˜ : Rn → [−1, 1] such that the following
hold. Consider (X,Y ) distributed in {−1, 1}n × {−1, 1}n where (Xi, Yi) are independent with
E[Xi] = E[Yi] = 0, E[X
2
i ] = E[Y
2
i ] = 1, E[XiYi] = ρ.
Consider (N,M) jointly Gaussian and distributed in Rn ×Rn with (Ni,Mi) independent with
E[Ni] = E[Mi] = 0, E[N
2
i ] = E[M
2
i ] = 1, E[NiMi] = ρ.
Then
• For the constant functions 1 and −1 it holds that 1˜ = 1 and −˜1 = −1.
• If f and g are two functions such that for all i, it holds that max(I log(1/τ)i (f), I log(1/τ)i (g)) < τ
then
|E[f(X)g(Y )]−E[f˜(N)g˜(M)]| ≤ ǫ. (36)
if
τ ≤ τ(ǫ, |ρ|) := ǫC
log(1/ǫ)
(1−|ρ|)ǫ , (37)
for some absolute constant C.
Proof. We briefly explain how does this follow from the [15] and [13]. Given f , we take small η
and look T1−ηf , where T is the Bonami-Beckner operator. For small η and every two functions f
and g it holds that E[f(X)g(Y )] is ǫ/4 close to E[T1−ηf(X)T1−ηg(Y )]. By Lemma 6.1 in [13] this
can be done with
η = C
(1− |ρ|)ǫ
log(1/ǫ)
.
T1−ηf is given by a multi-linear polynomial which we can also write in terms of Gaussian random
variables. Let’s call the Gaussian polynomial f ′. The polynomial f ′ has the same expected value
as f but in general it takes values in all of R. Similarly for different f and g we have E[f ′g′] =
E[T1−ηf(X)T1−ηg(Y )]. We let f˜(x) = f
′(x) if |f ′(x)| ≤ 1 and f ′(x) = 1 (f ′(x) = −1) if f ′(x) ≥ 1
(f ′(x) ≤ −1). It is easy to see that 1˜ = 1 and −˜1 = −1.
By Theorem 3.20 in [15] it follows that E[(f ′ − f˜)2] < ǫ2/16 if all influences of f are bounded
by τ given in (37). An immediate application of Cauchy-Schwartz implies that E[f ′(N)g′(M)] is
at most ǫ/2 far from E[f˜(N)f˜(M)]. We thus obtain Theorem 11.9.
29
11.5.3 Arrow Theorem for Low Influence Functions
We can prove a quantitative Arrow theorem for low influence functions. For the statement from
this point on, it would be useful to denote
τα(δ) := δ
C
log(1/δ)
αδ , τ(δ) := τ1/3(δ),
for some absolute constant C.
Theorem 11.10. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ(ǫ) > 0 and a τ(δ) > 0 such that the following
hold. Let f1, f2, f3 : {−1, 1}n → [−1, 1]. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds
that
min(uE[fi],−uE[fi+1]) ≤ 1− 3ǫ (38)
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n it holds that
I
log(1/τ)
j (fi) < τ,
Then it holds that
P(f1, f2, f3) > δ.
Moreover, assuming the uniform distribution, one may take:
δ =
1
4
(ǫ/2)20, τ = τ(δ,
1
3
).
And assuming a general symmetric voting distribution with a minimal probability α for every per-
mutation, one can take:
δ =
1
4
(ǫ/2)2+1/(2α
2), τ = τ(δ, 1 − 4α).
Proof. Let g1 = f˜1, g2 = f˜2 and g3 = f˜3, the functions whose existence is guaranteed by Theo-
rem 11.9. We will apply the theorem for the pairs of functions (f1, f2), (f2, f3) and (f3, f1) and the
correlations given in (10). Taking ρ = 0 and noting that T01 = 1 and 1˜ = 1, we conclude that for
all i it holds that |E[fi]−E[gi]| < ǫ. It therefore follows from (38) that the functions gi satisfy (33)
and therefore P (g1, g2, g3) ≥ 4δ, where the correlations between the gi’s are given by (10).
Recall that:
P (g1, g2, g3) =
1
4
(E[g1(N1)g2(N2)] +E[g2(N2)g3(N3)] +E[g3(N3)g1(N1)]) .
Applying theorem 11.9 we see that
|E[g1(N1)g2(N2)]−E[f1(xa>b)f2(xb>c)]| < δ,
and similarly for the other expectations. We therefore conclude that
P (f1, f2, f3) > P (g1, g2, g3)− 3δ/4 > δ,
as needed.
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11.5.4 Arrow Theorem For Low Cross Influences Functions
Our final result in the low influence realm deals with the situation that for each coordinate, at
most one function has large influence while the two others have small influences. Such a case
occurs for example when one function is a function of a small number of voters while the two others
are majority type functions. The main result of the current subsection shows that indeed is such
situation there is a good probability of a paradox. The proof is based on extending an averaging
argument from [13].
Theorem 11.11. For every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ(ǫ) > 0 and a τ(δ) > 0 such that the following
hold. Let f1, f2, f3 : {−1, 1}n → [−1, 1]. Assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and all u ∈ {−1, 1} it holds
that
min(uE[fi],−uE[fi+1]) ≤ 1− 3ǫ (39)
and for all j it holds that
|{1 ≤ i ≤ 3 : I log2 1/τj (fi) > τ}| ≤ 1. (40)
Then it holds that
P(f1, f2, f3) ≥ δ.
Moreover, assuming the uniform distribution, one may take:
δ =
1
8
(ǫ/2)20, τ = τ(δ, 1/3).
Assuming a general symmetric voting distribution with a minimal distribution α for every permu-
tation, one can take:
δ =
1
8
(ǫ/2)2+1/(2α
2), τ = τ(δ, 1 − 4α).
The proof will use the following lemma which is a special case of a lemma from [13].
Lemma 11.12. Let µ be a distribution on {−1, 1}2 with uniform marginals. Let f1, f2 : {−1, 1}n →
[0, 1]. Let S ⊂ [n] be a set of coordinates such that for each i ∈ S at most one of the functions
f1, f2 have Ii(fj) > ǫ. Define
gi(x) = E[fi(Y )|Y[n]\S = x[n]\S].
Then the functions gi do not depend on the coordinates in S, are [0, 1] valued, satisfy E[gi] = E[fi]
and
|E[f1(X)f2(Y )]]−E[g1(X)g2(Y )]| ≤ |S|
√
ǫ,
where (Xi, Yi) are independent distributed according to µ.
Proof. Recall that averaging over a subset of the variables preserves expected value. It also main-
tains the property of taking values in [0, 1] and decreases influences. Thus it suffices to prove the
claim for the case where |S| = 1. The general case then follows by induction.
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So assume without loss of generality that S = {1} consists of the first coordinate only and that
I2(f2) ≤ ǫ, so that E[(f2 − g2)2] ≤ ǫ. Then by Cauchy-Schwartz we have E[|f2 − g2|] ≤
√
ǫ and
using the fact that the functions are bounded in [0, 1] we obtain
|E[f1f2 − f1g2]| ≤
√
ǫ. (41)
Let us write E1 for the expected value with respect to the first variable. Recalling that the gi do
not depend on the first variable we obtain that
E1[f1g2] = g2E1[f1] = g1g2.
This implies that
E[f1g2] = E[g1g2], (42)
and the proof follows from (41) and(42).
We can now prove Theorem 11.11.
Proof. The proof will use the fact that the sum of low-degree influences (35) together with the fact
that averaging makes (standard influences) smaller. In order to work with these two notions of
influences simultaneously we begin by replacing each functions fi with the function T1−ηfi where
as in Theorem 11.9 we let
η = C1
αδ
log(1/δ)
,
where C1 is large enough so that
|E[f1(xa>b)f2(xb>c)]−E[T1−ηf1(xa>b)T1−ηf2(xb>c)]| < δ/10,
and similarly for other pairs of functions. Thus it suffices to prove the theorem assuming that all
function have total Fourier weight at most (1− η)2r above level r and therefore all functions fi and
all variables j satisfy Ij(fi) ≤ I≤rj (fi) + (1− η)2r.
Let C2 be chosen so that the statement of Theorem 11.10 holds for τ , where
τ = δC2
log(1/δ)
αδ .
Let
R = log(1/τ), R′ = log2(1/τ).
and choose C2 and C3 large enough so that
τ ′ = δC3
log(1/δ)
αδ ,
satisfies
3R
τ
√
τ ′ + (1− η)2R′ ≤ δ
16
.
Assume that fi satisfy (40), i.e., for all j:
|{1 ≤ i ≤ 3 : IR′j (fi) > τ ′}| ≤ 1.
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We will show that the statement of the theorem holds for fi. For this let
Si = {i : I≤Ri (fi) > τ},
and S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. Since R′ ≥ R and τ ′ ≤ τ , the sets Si are disjoint.
Moreover,each of the sets Si is of size at most
R
τ .
Also, if j ∈ S and I≤Rj (fi) > τ then for i 6= i′ it holds that I≤Rj (fi′) < τ ′ and therefore
Ij(fi′) ≤ τ ′ + (1− γ)2R′ . In other words, for all j ∈ S we have that at least two of the functions fi
satisfy Ij(fi) ≤ τ .
We now apply Lemma 11.12 with
f¯i(x) = E[fi(X)|X[n]\S = x[n]\S].
We obtain that for any pair of functions fi, fi+1 it holds that
|E[fifi+1]−E[f¯if¯i+1]| ≤ 2R
τ
√
τ ′ + (1− η)2R′ ≤ δ
16
. (43)
Note that the functions f¯i satisfy that maxi,j Ij(f¯i)) ≤ τ . This implies that the results of Theo-
rem 11.10 hold for f¯i. This together with (43) implies the desired result.
Remark 11.13. We note that Theorem 11.11 and the other theorems proven in this section hold
in further generality, where voters vote independently according to any (perhaps not symmetric)
distribution over the rankings where the probability of any ranking is at least α with bounds on τ
that are somewhat worse than those obtained here. The proof of these extensions is similar to the
proofs presented here (recall Remark 11.8). The main difference is since now the distributions of
xa>b etc. are biased, the applications of invariance principle results in somewhat worse results.
11.6 One Influential Variable
We note that Theorem 7.1 holds as stated for symmetric distributions with α being the minimum
probability over all permutations and
δ = (ǫ/2)2+1/(2α
2), τ = τ(δ, 1 − 4α).
The only difference in the proof is that instead of Theorem 6.2. we use Theorem 11.10.
11.7 Quantitative Arrow Theorem for 3 Candidates
We briefly state the generalization of Theorem 8.1 to symmetric distributions.
Theorem 11.14. The statement of the Theorem 8.1 holds true for symmetric distributions on 3
alternatives with minimum probability for each ranking α with
δ = exp
(
− C1
αǫC2(α)
)
, (44)
where C2(α) = 3 + 1/(2α
2).
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Proof. The proof is identical. In case (20), we now have
P (F ) > α2η3.
We thus obtain that P (F ) > δ where δ is given (44) by taking larger values C ′1 and C
′
2 for C1 and
C2.
In case (21), by Theorem 11.11 it follows that either there exist a function G which always put
a candidate at top / bottom and D(F,G) < ǫ (if (39) holds), or P (F ) > CǫC2(α) >> δ.
Similarly in the remaining case (22), we have by version of Theorem 7.1 for symmetric distribu-
tions that either D(F,G) < ǫ or P (F ) > CǫC2(α) >> δ. The proof follows.
11.8 Proof Concluded
The general version of Theorem 9.1 reads:
Theorem 11.15. Theorem 9.1 holds for symmetric distributions on k alternatives with minimum
probability for each ranking β and α = k!β/6 and
δ = exp
(
− C1
αǫC2(α)
)
, (45)
where C2(α) = 3 + 1/(2α
2).
Proof. The proof follows by applying Theorem 11.14 to triplets of alternatives as before. Note that
when restricting to 3 alternatives, the minimum probability assigned to each order is at least α.
12 Open Problems
As a conclusion we want to mention some natural open problems.
• We believe that the results obtained here hold also for non-symmetric distributions of rankings
as long as the probability of every ranking is bounded below by some constant α. Recalling
remarks 11.8 and 11.13, we see that the main challenge in extending the results to this setup
is extending the proof for the case where two different functions f and g have two different
influential voters. The problem in extending this result is the lack of inverse-hyper-contraction
results for biased measures on {−1, 1}n. Deriving such estimates is of independent interest.
• A second natural problem is to attempt and obtain other quantitative results in social choice
theory using Fourier methods. A natural candidate is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [8,
19]. A first quantitative estimates for 3 alternatives was obtained in [7]. As mentioned
before, the results of [7] are limited in the sense that they require neutrality and apply only
to 3 candidates. It is interesting to explore if the full quantitative version of Arrow theorem
proven here will allow to obtain stronger quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem.
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